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The presenter’s extended involvement in 
this investigation has resulted in a certain 
“comfort” with the subject matter.  This 
comfort should not be interpreted as being 
cold or unprofessional, nor as a lack of 
respect for the Columbia crew or their 
families; it only reflects the fact that 
extensive time with and exposure to the 
material has enabled coping with this 
tragedy and its outcome.  
Notice
Purpose of this briefing
• Summarize the investigation activities, key 
findings and recommendations
–Discuss how recommendations are being 
addressed by Shuttle and Orion
NASA/SP-2008-565, Columbia Crew Survival 
Investigation Report is available on-line at 
http://www.nasa.gov/reports
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Agenda
• Background
• Methods
• Accident Timeline
• Key Findings/Recommendations
Background
STS-107 History
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113th flight in the Shuttle Program 
28th flight of OV-102 Columbia 
16 day mission
Launch: Jan 16, 2003  
15:39 GMT (9:39 am CST)
81.7 seconds into flight, a piece of insulating foam 
separated from the ET and struck the orbiter’s left wing
De-orbit burn:  Feb. 1, 2003, 13:15 GMT (7:15 am CST)
Entry Interface (~400k ft, Mach 24.5) occurred at 13:44:09 GMT
Planned touchdown was 14:15 GMT (8:15 am CST)
Jan 16, 2003 Feb 1, 2003
• Columbia Accident Investigation Board 
(CAIB) chartered in Feb 2003
– A Crew Survival Working Group (CSWG) was 
formed to investigate the Columbia accident 
survival gap
• The group developed a top-level scenario for what 
happened to the crew module
• Lack of funding limited the investigation, and no report 
was published except for what the CAIB put into their 
report
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Investigation Background
• CAIB report published in August 2003
– CAIB report Observation 010.2-1 “Future 
crewed-vehicle requirements should incorporate 
the knowledge gained from the Challenger and 
Columbia accidents in assessing the feasibility of 
vehicles that could ensure crew survival even if 
the vehicle is destroyed.”
• Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated 
Investigation Team (SCSIIT) chartered in 
October 2004
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Investigation Background
(cont.)
• SCSIIT Purpose: Form a multi-disciplinary team 
(engineering, life sciences, crew equipment, crew 
training, etc) to learn everything possible from these 
events to improve both current and future crew survival
– Correlate structural/mechanical/thermal engineering with 
forensic pathology findings for both Challenger and Columbia
– Generate a report with specific recommendations for the 
enhancement of current vehicles and the future designs of 
manned space vehicles and crew safety equipment, and 
establish a comprehensive body of information for future efforts
– Develop “lessons-learned” for investigations and for future 
spacecraft design engineers, physicians supporting manned 
space flight, and NASA managers. 
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Investigation Background
(cont.)
Methods
Methods
• To understand the environment the crew 
experienced, investigators need to look at the 
accelerations, thermal, and atmospheric aspects 
of the accident.
• Several sources of data are needed for building 
an integrated story – video, debris, vehicle 
telemetry, medical, modeling/ simulation
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Methods (cont.)
• Video anchored key events
– Loss of Control
– Vehicle breakup
– Forebody breakup
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Methods (cont.)
• Debris analysis proved to be immensely 
complicated
– Easy to develop a false scenario from one or two 
pieces of debris
– Best for broad assessments
• fire? 
• directional loading? 
• thermal events?
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Methods (cont.)
• Thermal and loads are inter-related due to the trajectory, 
and are driven by ballistic number
– Report includes a “Ballistics Tutorial”
– Trajectory (translation) models can also provide thermal 
exposure estimates
• Key point to understand is the ballistic number
– Difficult to determine ballistic number for complex shapes
– Ballistics analysis cannot account for cascading 
failures/intermediate configurations
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Methods (cont.)
• Aerodynamic models were used to analyze forebody 
attitude
– Necessary in determining crew accelerations from highly-
directional (and constantly changing) deceleration loads
• This analysis was difficult
– Aerodynamic model of forebody did not exist
– Results were highly dependent on initial conditions
– Aerodynamic properties in hypersonic regime not fully 
understood
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Methods (cont.)
• Attempted to develop the cabin depressurization 
timeline from both angles
– What did medical data indicate
• Literature search of past depress accidents
– What did debris indicate
• Structural debris – middeck floor
• Debris cluster analysis of crew module structure vs. crew equipment
• Depressurization tests on drink bags and hygiene packages
– Boundary driven – “not greater than,” “no earlier 
than,” etc
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Methods
• Areas that were extraordinarily hard:
– Materials in a high temp., low pressure, monatomic 
oxygen (highly reactive) environment
– Hypersonic separation dynamics
• Suit failure – Why?  How?
• Seat Separation
• Shock wave impingement/shock-shock interaction
– Emotional impact of analyzing the final moments of 
the crew’s lives
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Accident Timeline
• 13:44:09 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (7:44:09 am Central) 
- Entry Interface (~400,000’, Mach 24.5)
• 13:58:40 – Backup Flight Software (BFS) Fault Messages 
were annunciated on board: left inboard tire pressure reading 
goes off scale low
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• 13:44:09 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) (7:44:09 am Central) -
Entry Interface (~400,000’, Mach 24.5)
• 13:58:40 – Backup Flight Software (BFS) Fault Messages were 
annunciated on board, left inboard tire pressure reading goes off 
scale low
• 13:59:32 – Loss Of Signal (LOS) - loss of real time telemetry data 
in the MCC
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• 13:44:09 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) - Entry Interface 
(~400,000’, Mach 24.5)
• 13:58:40 – Backup Flight Software (BFS) Fault Messages were 
annunciated on board, left inboard tire pressure reading goes off 
scale low
• 13:59:32 – Loss Of Signal (LOS) - loss of real time telemetry data 
in the MCC
• 13:59:32 - 13:59:37 - Reconstructed General Purpose Computer 
(RGPC1) data indicate systems nominal, increase to 4 yaw jets & 
bank angle to try to eliminate yaw error & rate
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• 13:44:09 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) - Entry Interface 
(~400,000’, Mach 24.5)
• 13:58:40 – Backup Flight Software (BFS) Fault Messages were 
annunciated on board, left inboard tire pressure reading goes off 
scale low
• 13:59:32 – Loss Of Signal (LOS) - loss of real time telemetry data 
in the MCC
• 13:59:32 - 13:59:37 - Reconstructed General Purpose Computer 
(RGPC1) data indicate systems nominal, increase to 4 yaw jets & 
bank angle to try to eliminate yaw error & rate
• 13:59:37 - Start of vehicle Loss of Control (LOC), based on Roll 
Ref alarm at 13:59:46
– Vehicle dynamics were within human tolerance (probably no injuries, 
but probably disorienting)
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
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LOC Sim Video CDR POV Sim Video
13:59:37 – 13:59:46
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• 14:00:03 - 14:00:05 – RGPC2 data indicate cabin parameters 
were normal, auxiliary power units (APUs) were running but 
hydraulic pressures and quantities were zero
– Panel R2 APU switches
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• 14:00:03 - 14:00:05 –RGPC2 data indicate cabin parameters 
were normal, auxiliary power units (APUs) were running but 
hydraulic pressures and quantities were zero
– Panel R2 APU switches
• 14:00:18 – Main vehicle break-up, or “Catastrophic Event” 
(CE), based on video & Operational/ Experimental (OEX) 
recorder power loss 
– Forebody separation was due to starboard payload bay sill failure 
(thermal), and the starboard X-link pulled through the 582 ring 
frame. The forebody yawed left and pitched down, and the port 
X-link failed at the 582. The crew module shifted inside the 
forward fuselage, causing impacts & probable breaches (Vol. E 
damaged from below)
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
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Yaw left
Pitch down
Orbiter Struc 101
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CM shift inside FF
CE VideoLOC-CE Quad Video
• 14:00:03 - 14:00:05 – Reconstructed General Purpose 
Computer (RGPC) data indicate cabin parameters were 
normal, auxiliary power units (APUs) were running but 
hydraulic pressures and quantities were zero
– Panel R2 APU switches
• 14:00:18 – Main vehicle break-up, or “Catastrophic Event” 
(CE), based on video & OEX recorder power loss 
– Medical evidence indicates that the cabin pressure condition at 
CE was within the bounds of human survival.  Therefore the 
cabin depressurization started No Earlier Than (NET) the CE at 
14:00:18
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• 14:00:35 – Cabin depressurization start No Later Than (NLT) 
time, based on ballistics on patch
– First lethal event: cabin depressurization (unconsciousness in 
~6-8 seconds)
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• 14:00:35 – Cabin depressurization start No Later Than (NLT) 
time, based on ballistics on patch
• 14:00:53 – Crew module break-up, or “Crew Module 
Catastrophic Event” (CMCE), based on video
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• 14:00:35 – Cabin depressurization start No Later Than (NLT) 
time, based on ballistics on patch
• 14:00:53 – Crew module break-up, or “Crew Module 
Catastrophic Event” (CMCE), based on video
• 14:00:59 – Cabin depress complete No Later Than (NLT) 
time, based on video – crew module lost significant structural 
integrity by this time
SCSIIT   Page 33
Accident Timeline (cont.)
• 14:00:35 – Cabin depressurization start No Later Than (NLT) 
time, based on ballistics on patch
• 14:00:53 – Crew module break-up, or “Crew Module 
Catastrophic Event” (CMCE), based on video
• 14:00:59 – Cabin depress complete No Later Than (NLT) 
time, based on video – crew module lost significant structural 
integrity by this time
• 14:01:10 - Total Dispersal, based on video
– Apache video of CMCE thru TD
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• Following CE and CMCE (unconscious crew):
– Second lethal event: exposure to a dynamic rotating 
environment with nonconformal helmets and a lack of 
upper body restraint 
– Third lethal event: separation from the crew module and 
seats with associated forces, material interactions, and 
thermal consequences
– Fourth lethal event: exposed to near vacuum (~0.03 psi 
@140,000’), aerodynamic accelerations, and cold 
temperatures 
– Fifth lethal event: ground impact 
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Accident Timeline (cont.)
• First lethal event: cabin depressurization 
unconsciousness in ~6-8 seconds
– SURVIVABLE with current shuttle crew escape hardware
• Second lethal event: exposure to a dynamic 
rotating environment with nonconformal helmets 
and a lack of upper body restraint
– SURVIVABLE with current technology
• Third lethal event: separation from the crew module 
and seats with associated forces, material 
interactions, and thermal consequences 
– NOT SURVIVABLE with current technology
SCSIIT   Page 36
Lethal Events Summary
• Fourth lethal event: exposed to near vacuum (~0.03 
psi @140,000’), aerodynamic accelerations, and 
cold temperatures 
– SURVIVABLE? with current technology (if equipment 
remains intact)
• Fifth lethal event: ground impact 
– SURVIVABLE with current shuttle crew escape hardware 
(if equipment remains intact and automatic parachute 
sequence is initiated)
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Lethal Events Summary
Key Findings and
Recommendations
Vehicle Design and Operations
• Three crewmembers did not complete glove donning, one did 
not complete helmet donning nor seat strap-in. The deorbit 
preparation period of shuttle missions is so busy that crew 
members frequently do not have enough time to complete the 
deorbit preparation tasks prior to the deorbit burn.
– Future spacecraft and crew survival systems should be designed 
such that the equipment and procedures provided to protect the 
crew in emergency situations are compatible with nominal 
operations. Future spacecraft vehicles, equipment, and mission 
timelines should be designed such that a suited crew member 
can perform all operations without compromising the 
configuration of the survival suit during critical phases of flight 
– Shuttle D/O Prep training partially addresses this. Hardware and 
timeline issues not addressed by Shuttle 
– Constellation suits and Orion have requirements to 
accommodate suit donning in 1 hour.  Cabin reconfiguration 
operations are not addressed
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Vehicle/Suit interfaces
• The current Advanced Crew Escape Suit (ACES) was added 
after the shuttle cockpit was designed and built. In many 
cases, the operations that the crew must perform are difficult 
to perform while wearing the suit. Some crewmembers must 
choose between not wearing portions of the suit (gloves) to 
perform tasks efficiently, or wearing their gloves to protect 
against off-nominal atmospheric situations at the expense of 
nominal operations
– Future spacecraft and crew survival systems should be designed 
such that the equipment and procedures provided to protect the 
crew in emergency situations are compatible with nominal 
operations. Future spacecraft vehicles, equipment, and mission 
timelines should be designed such that a suited crew member 
can perform all operations without compromising the 
configuration of the survival suit during critical phases of flight 
– Orion is being designed to be operable by a pressure suited 
crewmember
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Vehicle Redundancy
• Complete loss of hydraulic pressure to the aerosurfaces 
resulting from the breach in the left wing was the 
probable proximal cause for the vehicle LOC 
– Future vehicles should be designed with a separation of critical 
functions to the maximum extent possible and robust protection 
for individual functional components when separation is not 
practical
– Orion required to comply with the requirement in JSC Design 
and Procedural Standards, Section G-2
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Crew Suits
• None of the crew members lowered 
and locked their visors  
– Future spacecraft crew survival systems 
should not rely on manual activation to 
protect the crew
– Not currently addressed by Constellation 
requirements or designs  
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Crew Suits
• Lethal injuries resulted from 
inadequate upper body restraint and 
protection during rotational motion
– Design suit helmets with head protection 
as a functional requirement. Suits should 
incorporate conformal helmets with head 
and neck restraint devices
– The Constellation Suit has head impact 
and head/neck injury protection 
requirements
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Crew Seats
• The seat inertial reels did not lock. Lethal injuries 
resulted from inadequate upper body restraint and 
protection during rotational motion 
– The current shuttle inertial reels should be manually 
locked at the first sign of an off-nominal situation
– Shuttle crews are now instructed to lock inertial reels at the 
first sign of an off-nominal situation. Also added a step to 
the LOC/Breakup procedures
– The use of inertial reels in future restraint systems should 
be evaluated to ensure that they are capable of protecting 
the crew during nominal and off-nominal situations without 
active crew intervention
– Shuttle seat inertial reels have been changed to MA-16 
type (seat acceleration-sensing in addition to strap 
acceleration-sensing)
– Orion seats do not use inertial reels 
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Crew Seats
• The seat restraint system caused lethal-level 
injuries to the unconscious or deceased crew 
members when they separated from the seat
– Future spacecraft suits and seat restraints should use 
state-of-the-art technology in an integrated solution to 
minimize crew injury and maximize crew survival in off-
nominal acceleration environments
– Orion seats are being designed with Occupant Protection 
as a key driver.  Design features include lateral bolsters, 
flail restraints, and wide belts. 
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Crew Training
• The current training regimen separates 
vehicle systems training from crew escape 
training.  
– Incorporate objectives in the astronaut training 
program that emphasize understanding the 
transition from recoverable systems problems to 
impending survival situations
– Not currently addressed formally in crew training
– Informally addressed by CDR and crew escape 
training
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Crew Procedures
• The vehicle LOC emergency egress procedures 
taught to the STS-107 crew did not address a LOC 
occurring during entry
– Assemble a team of crew escape instructors, flight directors, 
and astronauts to assess orbiter procedures in the context of 
ascent, deorbit, and entry contingencies. Revise the 
procedures with consideration to time constraints and the 
interplay among the thermal environment, expected crew 
module dynamics, and crew and crew equipment capabilities
– For Shuttle – in work
– Prior to operational deployment of future crewed spacecraft, 
determine the vehicle dynamics, entry thermal and 
aerodynamic loads, and crew survival envelopes during a 
vehicle LOC so that they may be adequately integrated into 
training programs
– Not yet addressed for Orion
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Investigation Process
• SCSIIT effort suffered from a low priority relative to 
other shuttle program recovery efforts.  Team 
members had to divide their time between the 
investigation work and the work for their home 
organization.  This led to delays in completing the 
SCSIIT work and, in some cases, significant 
decrease in availability or complete loss of 
members of the SCSIIT.
– In the event of a future fatal human spaceflight mishap, 
NASA should place high priority on the crew survivability 
aspects of the mishap both during the investigation as well 
as in its follow-up actions using dedicated individuals 
appropriately qualified in this specialized work. 
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The SCSIIT investigation was performed with 
the belief that a comprehensive, respectful 
investigation could provide knowledge that would 
improve the safety of future space flight crews and 
explorers.
By learning these lessons and ensuring that we 
continue the journey begun by the crews of Apollo 
1, Challenger, and Columbia, we help to give 
meaning to their sacrifice and the sacrifice of their 
families. It is for them, and for the future 
generations of explorers, that we strive to be better 
and go farther. 
Summation
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Ad Astra Per Aspera – Semper Exploro
To the Stars Through Adversity - Always Exploring
Apollo 1 – Challenger – Columbia
COЮЗ 1 - COЮЗ 11
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Main engine-related 
switches (paddle-type)
Hydraulic circulation 
pump switches  for 
hydraulic systems 2 
and 3 (paddle-type)
APU Operate switches  
for APUs 2 and 3 
(lever lock type)
Return
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Return
